| **The Republic of Cyprus**  |
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| **Competition Framework** |
| Competition Law | The Protection of Competition Laws (PCL), enacted in 1990 and last amended in 2022. The Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (CCBU) Law, enacted in 2014.*[Please Introduce the name of the laws constituting the National Competition Law Regime. Include the year of enaction and the corresponding amendments as well.* |
| Competition Authority | The Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) ([www.competition.gov.cy](http://www.competition.gov.cy)) was established by the PCL in 1990. *[Please introduce here the name of the competition authorities that are part of the enforcement process of the laws mentioned in the previous question. In that regard, please specify the norms that established those agencies, the year in which they started operation, and their website. Include tribunals only if they have a role in the process of founding guilt and imposing sanctions. This point specifically excludes judicial authorities that only have judicial review powers]* |
| **Policy-Making Agents****-Diversification-** |
| How many agencies are responsible for competition enforcement? | The CPC was established by Section 8 of the PCL. Under Section 26(2), the CPC’s duties include: (1) decide, following an investigation, infringements of the PCL or the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) either on its own initiative or following a complaint; (2) decide whether collusion falls under the PCL OR THE TFEU; (3) decide whether agreement or undertaking falls under the PCL; (4) impose administrative fines and sanctions; (5) decide on interim measures; (6) withdraw the benefit of an applied exemption issued by the European Commission; (7) issue announcements, recommendations and guidelines regarding competition issues; (8) issue announcement regarding protection of personal data; (9) provide opinion on issues within its competence to any public body; (10) decide on party’s commitment; (11) conduct investigations in a specific sector or on specific types of agreements; (12) determine the priority for examining cases; (13) exercise any other competence granted the PCL or regulations made by the European Union legislation. *[Please mention how many authorities have a general mandate to enforce competition in your jurisdiction. Include a brief reference on their duties e.g.: if they impose criminal, civil or administrative liability. The purpose is that readers can quickly understand, which are the agencies charged with competition enforcement in the jurisdiction, the difference between them, and if they have concurrent, overlapping, or exclusionary authority. Include the relevant provisions on which their powers are based. Exclude in this point sector regulators or enforcers]* |
| Do sector regulators have a competition policy enforcement mandate? | No*[Please introduce the name agencies that have powers to enforce any aspect of competition law, including merger control, in specific sectors. Introduce the relevant provisions on which their powers are based]* |
| Have the Competition Authority and other agencies signed protocols or memoranda of understanding with sector regulators? | No*[Please mention here any provision or interinstitutional agreement that allows the competition authorities to coordinate behavior to effectively enforce competition law.]* |
| **Disaggregated Functions—Prosecutorial Model** |
| Are there different authorities or agencies that make the decision to investigate and the final ruling in the cases? | No | *[If the answer is yes, please explain briefly the enforcement process, and include the relevant provisions. The purpose of this question is to understand the enforcement model of the jurisdiction and establish how many independent authorities are involved in the enforcement process and what are their functions.]* |
| Are disputes presented for decision to judiciary authorities? | No | *[If the answer to your question is “yes”, please introduce the name of the judiciary authorities that are involved and their role until the final decision in the process is achieved; exclude from this question judiciary authorities whose role in the process is the judicial review of administrative decisions.*  |
| Do private rights of action to challenge competition law infringements exist in your jurisdiction | Yes  | According to the PCL Section 63, any person who has suffered damage as a result of the infringement of the PCL or TFEU shall have the right to sue for damages. *[If the answer is “yes”, please explain briefly the process and who are the persons entitled to exercise those rights; mention the relevant provisions]* |
| *\* Please fill the next sections for each of the authorities mentioned in the prior sections excluding sector regulators*  |
| **The Commission for the Protection of Competition****(CPC)** |
| **Status of the Competition Authority**  |
| **Accountability** | Please, answer “Yes” in the boxes of this line if any of the duties on the right column apply to the authority, and “No” if they do not. |  Answer with X/√ as it applies  | Please, in the boxes of this line mention the relevant provisions in which the obligations are based. |
| Does the Competition Authority have obligations before the executive? | Yes | √ | Obligations to report to the executive on on-going investigations upon request.  | **PCL Section 24** (duty to informing the Minister of possible infringement of law relating to consumer protection); **PCL Section 31(3)** (CPC may publish a report of its investigation in specific sectors to the competent Ministries);  |
| √ | The decisions of the Competition Authority may be vetoed by a ministry or by the executive branch. m | **PCL Section 5(1)** (The Council of Ministers may declare that certain categories of collusion not regulated by the PCL)  |
|  √ | The executive has to report on an annual basis to the executive. | **PCL Section 67(1)** (CPC shall submit to the Minister and the Parliamentary Committee on Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism an annual report)*[Introduce the relevant provisions]* |
| Does the Competition Authority have obligations before the legislature? |  Yes  |  √ | Obligation to publish an annual report on its activities. | **PCL Section 67(1)** (see above) |
|  X | Obligation to stand before parliament and to respond to congressmen on an annual basis. | *[Introduce the relevant provisions]* |
| X | Its activities are monitored by an independent auditor or by oversight committees.  | *[Introduce the relevant provisions]* |
| Does the Competition Authority have obligations before the judiciary or independent agencies? | Yes  |  √  | Decisions of the Competition Authority are subject to judicial review. | **PCL Section 20(5**) (CPC’s decisions shall be subject to judicial review pursuant to Article 146 of the Constitution; and CPC shall participate as an adversary before the Court and shall have the same rights as the parties to the said proceedings.) *[Aside from the relevant provisions please mention the judicial authority charged with the review.]* |
| X | Decisions of the Competition Authority are subject to review or control of an independent authority different from the judiciary?  | *[Aside from the relevant provisions, please mention the authority charged with the review.]* |
| **Other obligations/comments:** *[Please introduce any other obligation or comment that you consider relevant.**Introduce any comment that you consider relevant regarding the status of accountability of accountability of the competition authority.]* |
| **Independence** | Please, answer “Yes” or “No |  |
| Are the criteria for appointment and removal of the head/board members clear and transparent? | Yes | Under the PCL Section 9, five commissioners, including the Chairman, are appointed by the Council of Ministers. According to Section 13(3), the Council of Ministers may remove the Chairman or other commissioners when: (1). He has been declared bankrupt; (2). He has been declared insane or mentally incapable; (2). He has been convicted of a criminal offense entailing dishonesty or moral turpitude; (4). He is physically incapable of performing his duties; (5). He has maintained or acquired financial or other interest which may affect the impartiality of his judgement and he did not submit his resignation; (6). He has abused his tenure to render his continuing term of office prejudicial to the public interest; (7). He unjustifiably abstains from the exercise of his duties and unjustifiably absence from three consecutive meetings of the CPC. [Please introduce the relevant provisions, and if the answer to this question is “no”, explain briefly why in your opinion the criteria are not clear or transparent.] |
| Does the executive have powers to decide onspecific cases based on public interest? | Yes | According to the PCL Section 27(2), CPC’s decision shall take into account public interest considerations regarding violation of the PCL and TFEU. [Please introduce the relevant provisions, and if the answer to the question is “yes”, explain in which cases the executive can decide on public interest bases.] |
| Does the executive retain decision-making powers over the Competition Authority? | Yes | According to PCL Section 5(1), the Council of Ministers may declare that provisions of the PCL shall not apply to certain categories of collusive conducts.  |
| Is the Competition Authority obliged to publish reasoned decisions to ensure transparency? | Yes | Under PCL Section 20(2), the decisions of the CPC shall be communicated to every natural or legal person or entity involved (with the exception of private litigation as described in Section 44(5), (6), and (7)) and shall published in the Official Gazette of the Republic and on the CPC’s website. [Please introduce the relevant provisions.] |
| Is there a provision of the national budget allocated by law to the Competition Authority toensure its proper functioning? | Yes | Under PCL Section 8(3), CPC shall be independent as far as the allocation of the funds in its budget is concerned. [Please introduce the relevant provisions and the budget assigned to the authority for the current year and the next if it is already approved] |
| Can the Competition Authority be financed by its own means (notification fees, fines, etc.)? | No | [Please introduce the relevant provisions and mention the means by which the authority can be financed on its own] |
| **Governance of the Competition Authority** |
| Is the Competition Authority governed by a single chairman or by a collegiate body? | Collegiate body. Under Section 9 (1) of the PCL, the CPC is composed of five commissioners with one commissioner serving as the Chairman. *[Answer “single chairman” if the directive organ of the authority is composed of one person. Answer “collegiate body” if the authority's directive organ is composed of two or more members, regardless if this organ is directed or presided by a chairman or president. Also mention how many board members or directors are part of the Direction Body]* |
| How are the members of the Authority’s directive organ chosen?  | Under Section 9(2)(a) of the PCL, the Chairman, who must be a person of high standing and possessing specialized knowledge and experience in law, is appointed by the Council of Ministers. [Please describe the election process for choosing the members of the directive organ. Include relevant provisions; mention the branch government involved in this process] |
| Is there a fixed period during which removal is prohibited? | No | *[If your answer is “yes”, please introduce the duration of the tenure and the relevant provisions. If the answer is no, please refer if there are specific and restricted grounds under which the members of the Directive body can be removed; mention if they are elected for a term and introduce the relevant provisions]* |
| Is the tenure of the heads renewable? | Yes | According to Section 9(3) of the PCL, the term of office for the Chairman and the other four commissioners shall be five years and may be renewed only once. *[Please introduce the relevant provisions]* |
| Are the heads required by law to have certain minimum qualifications (degree in law or economics, age,experience)? | Yes | PCL Section 9(2)(b) states that the Chairman shall be filled by a person who is a practicing advocate for a period of ten years or serving or having served as a judge of any rank. Section 9(2)(c) also states that commissioners shall be renowned for their scientific expertise, professional capabilities, and experience in the legal and/or economic sector, especially on issues of competition; at least one of the four commissioners must be a distinguished professional with scientific expertise and professional competence and experience in the economic sector (economists). *[If your answer is “yes”, please make reference to the qualifications required by law and the relevant provisions].* |
| **Architecture** |
| Is the Competition Authority a stand-alone agency with an independent physical location or is it part of a bigger entity such as a ministry? | Stand-alone | *[If your answer is “part of a bigger entity”, please explain briefly how the bigger entity is organized.]* |
| **Policy Duties** |
| Does the Competition Authority have an exclusive mandate on competition or multiple mandates? | Non-Exclusive  | X | Concurrent consumer protection mandate. |
| X | Concurrent IP mandate. |
| **Other mandates**: *[Include any other mandates entrusted to the Competition Authority]*  |
| **Portfolio Instruments** |
| **Law Enforcement** |
| Does the Competition Authority have powers to investigate cartels? | Yes | According to Section 3(1), concerted/cartels conduct includes: (1). Directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices; (2). Limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investments; (3). Share markets, geographically or otherwise, or sources of supply; (4). Apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions thereby placing certain business operators at a competitive disadvantage; (5). Make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligation which have no connection with the subject of such contracts.According to Section 4(1), concerted/cartels conduct is permissible if: (1). It contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; (2). It does not impose restrictions which are not indispensable to achieve these objectives; and (3). It does not provide the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the product in question. Additionally, under Section 5(1), the Council of Ministers may issue Orders which allow certain collusions. Under Section 29, once infringement of the PCL is found, the CPC may: (1). Impose administrative fines; (2) Order the undertakings or associations of undertakings to refrain from repeating the same in the future; (3). Impose conditions and rectifying behavioral measures or structural measures to bring such infringement to an end. Under Section 30, before the issuance of a decision and the undertakings or associations of undertakings are willing to meet the concerns expressed by the CPC, the CPC may make those commitments binding and deem whether such commitments are satisfied. Under Section 34, the CPC may order that interim measures are taken and impose as it deems that are necessary in each case. [If the answer is “yes”, please mention the type of liability that the actions of the agency seek: civil, criminal, administrative. Introduce the relevant provisions; briefly explain if the powers of the authority are limited to certain types of cartels and what kind of sanctions can be imposed.] |
| Does the Competition Authority have powers to investigate unilateral Conduct? | Yes |  According to Section 6(1), abuse of a dominant position is defined as: (1). Direct or indirect fixing of unfair purchase or selling prices or any other unfair trading conditions; (2). Limiting production, distribution, or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (3). Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, thereby placing certain business operators at a competitive disadvantage; (4). Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such contracts. Under Section 7(1), abuse of a dominant position shall not apply to: (1). Agreements relating to wages and terms of employment and working conditions; (2). Business operators entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of revenue producing monopoly. Under Section 29, once infringement of the PCL is found, the CPC may: (1). Impose administrative fines; (2) Order the undertakings or associations of undertakings to refrain from repeating the same in the future; (3). Impose conditions and rectifying behavioral measures or structural measures to bring such infringement to an end. Under Section 30, before the issuance of a decision and the undertakings or associations of undertakings are willing to meet the concerns expressed by the CPC, the CPC may make those commitments binding and deem whether such commitments are satisfied. Under Section 34, the CPC may order that interim measures are taken and impose as it deems that are necessary in each case. [If the answer is “yes”, please mention briefly if the competition authority is invested with the power to pursue exploitative and exclusionary effects, also make reference to relevant provisions, the type of liability that the actions of the authority seek, and what kind of sanctions can be imposed.] |
| Does the Competition Authority have the powers to conduct *ex-ante* merger review? | Yes | Under Section 6(1) of the CCBU, concentration is defined as: (1). The merger of two or more previously independent business or parts of business; or (2). The acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one business, or by one or more business, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other business. In addition, joint venture shall constitute as a concentration. According to Section 3(2) of the CCBU, an act of concentration shall be major importance where: (1). The aggregate revenue of at least two of the participating business is more than €3,500,000 (USD $3,808,437); (2). At least two of the participating businesses achieve the revenue within Cyprus; and (3). At least €3,500,000 (USD $3,808,437) out of the aggregate revenue of all the participating businesses is achieved within Cyprus; or (4). Declared by the Order of the Minister as major importance. Under Section 4(1) of the CCBU, the Council of Ministers may amend the minimum revenue threshold. According to Section 19 of the CCBU, during review of the concentration, the CPC must consider: (1). The need to maintain and develop conditions of effective competition within the relevant markets in the view of the structure of the affected markets, the structure of other markets where the concentration might have significant implication, and the actual or potential competition located either within or out of Cyprus; (2). The market position of the participating business operators and of the business operators connected with them, the economic and financial power of the participating business operators, the alternative supply sources of the products and services in the affected markets and/or in other markets where the concentration might have significant implications and their substitutes, the supply and demand for all the products and services, any barriers to entry in the affected markets and/or in other markets where the concentration might have significant implications, the interest of the intermediate and ultimate consumers of the relevant products and services, and the contribution on the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition. Under Section 22 of the CCBU, after being notified, the CPC shall examine the concentration as soon as it is received and: (1). Concludes whether the concentration falls within the scope of the CCBU; or (2). Decides not to oppose the concentration after concluding the concentration does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the functioning of competition; or (3). Decides to initiate the full investigation proceedings and invite business operators to pay the notification fee after finding that the concentration raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the functioning of competition in the market. Under Section 25 of the CCBU, where a decision to initiate the full investigation proceedings is made, the CPC must: (1). Obtain any additional information which deems necessary; (2). Notify the participating business operators that they may modify the concentration or offer commitment; (3). Examine whether anticompetitive concerns have been resolved and negotiate with participating business operators. Under Section 26, the participating business operators under the full investigation proceedings may express their views regarding the concentration to the CPC. Under Section 28, upon conclusion of the full investigation, the CPC shall: (1). Declare the concentration as compatible with the functioning of competition in the market subject to any specific terms and relevant commitments made by the participants in the concentration; or (2). Declare the concentration in question as incompatible with the functioning of competition in the market. Under Section 46, the CPC may order the dissolution or partial dissolution of a concentration in order to secure the restoration of the functioning of competition in the market. The dissolution or partial dissolution shall be achieved by: (1). Deprivation of shares, assets, or rights; (2). Cancellation of any contracts which created the conditions of the concentration; or (3). A combination of the ways described above or with other ways as the CPC deems necessary. According to Section 40, the CPC may impose sanctions on the participants of the concentration who violates the CCBU: (1). An administrative fine not exceeding 10% of the total revenue for the immediately preceding financial year of the business operators who has the obligation for notification, and an administrative fine not exceeding €8,000 (USD $8,705) for every day during the violation continues if the participant closes the transaction without approval; (2). An administrative fine not exceeding €50,000 (USD $54,406) for the supply of false or misleading information in compliance with an obligation; (3). An administrative fine not exceeding €50,000 (USD $54,406) in case of omission to provide information; (4). An administrative fine not exceeding 10 percent of the total revenue for the immediately preceding financial year of the business operators who has the obligation for notification, and an administrative fine not exceeding €8,000 (USD $8,705) for every day during the violation continues if the participant implements the transaction which the CPC declared anticompetitive; (5). An administrative fine not exceeding 10 percent of the total revenue for the immediately preceding financial year of the business operators who has the obligation for notification, and an administrative fine not exceeding €8,000 (USD $8,705) for every day during the violation continues if the participant fails to dissolute or partially dissolute as ordered by the CPC. [If the answer is “yes”, please explain briefly the process and which are the remedies that authority can seek or impose and mention the relevant provisions] |
| Is the notification of merger transactions mandatory? | Yes | According to Section 3(2) of the CCBU, an act of concentration shall be major importance where: (1). The aggregate revenue of at least two of the participating businesses is more than €3,500,000 (USD $3,808,437); and (2). At least two of the participating businesses achieve the revenue within Cyprus; and (3). At least €3,500,000 (USD $3,808,437) out of the aggregate revenue of all the participating businesses is achieved within Cyprus; or (4). Declared by the Order of the Minister as major importance. Under Section 4(1) of the CCBU, the Council of Ministers may amend the minimum revenue threshold. Under Section 10 of the CCBU, concentration of major importance must be notified to the CPC before implementation and following conclusion of an agreement, announcement of public bid, or acquisition of a controlling interest. Notification of major important concentration must be made jointly or separately by those who participate in the transaction. After notification, the CPC shall publish the participating business operators, the nature of the concentration, and the economic sectors involved in the Official Gazette of the Republic. [If the answer is “yes”, please explain whether all the transactions shall be notified or if there is a threshold; mention relevant provisions] |
| Can the parties close the transaction before the final decision of the Authority (suspensory effect of merger notification)? | No | Under Section 11 of the CCBU, it is prohibited for a concentration to be implemented until: (1). The notifying party receives a notice of approval from the CPC; or (2). The application of Section 24 (the initial CPC time-limit expires) or Section 29(2) (the extended CPC time-limit expires). [Please mention the relevant provisions and add any explanation that you deem necessary] |
| Does the Competition Authority have the power to carry out *ex-post* merger investigations? | No | [Please mention relevant provisions] |
| Does the Competition Authority have the power to impose remedies on *ex-post* merger investigations? | No | [If the answer is yes, please mention the remedies that the Authority can impose; mention relevant provisions]  |
| Does the Competition Authority have powers to conduct dawn raids at premises? | Yes | According to Section 38(1) of the PCL, the CPC may carry out all the necessary expected or unexpected inspections on undertakings or association of undertakings. Those inspections include: (1). Entering any office, premises, land, and transportation; (2). Examining records, books, accounts, and other records related to the business; (3). Taking or acquiring copies of records, books, accounts, and any other documents of business activity; (4). Sealing any business premises, records, books, accounts, and other business records; (5). Questioning any representative or member of business for explanations on facts or documents. Section 38(2)(a) states that those inspections must be carried out upon a mandate of the CPC and following written authorization. Section 38(4) states that inspections are conducted without prior notice unless the CPC considers that prior notice will assist the investigation. Section 39(1) states that no judicial warrant is needed for dawn raids inspections. [If the answer is “yes”, please mention whether the dawn raids shall be authorized by a judge, and mention the relevant provisions] |
| Can the Competition Authority investigate *ex officio* cases? | Yes | Under Section 36(1) of the PCL, the CPC has the power to collect information that it considers necessary for the exercise of its responsibilities. [Please, mention the relevant provisions] |
| Does the Competition Authority have powers to accept leniency applications? | Yes | According to PCL Section 47(5), the CPC may grant immunity or reduce the amount of administrative fine that would otherwise be imposed on an undertaking or an association of undertakings, based on the criteria and requirements set out in the Leniency Programme. Section 2 defines the Leniency Programme as programme issued for the purpose of regulating the criteria and requirements for granting immunity or exemption or reduction of the administrative fine imposed by the CPC. [If the answer is “yes”, please mention if there is any limitation for the applicants, what are the benefits, and mention the relevant provisions. Include any commentary that you consider relevant about the leniency program] |
| Does the Competition Authority have powers to accept seek criminal punishment? | No | Although the PCL does not give the CPC authority to seek criminal punishment, the PCL includes criminal liability in Section 59 to 62. Under those sections, a person could be criminally liable for violating the CPC’s decision and his duty to secrecy. [ If the answer is “yes”, please mention the different kinds of sanctions that the agency can impose]  |
| **Advocacy** |
| Can the Competition Authority issue opinions on draft legislation? | Yes | According to Section 26(1)(m), the CPC may provide an opinion on issues within its competence to any public body. [if the answer is yes, please specify if there is any kind of limitation to the agency’s authority to issue opinions, include relevant provisions] |
| Is the executive and/or the legislature obliged to request the opinion of the Competition Authority when drafting legislation that may impactcompetition? | No  | [if the answer is yes, include relevant provisions] |
| **Rulemaking** |
| Can the Competition Authority issue guidelines? | Yes | √ | Guidelines on the calculation of fines. |
| √ | Guidelines on merger control. |
| √ | Guidelines on the economic analysis of abuse of dominance cases. |
| Can the Competition Authority issue binding regulation on competition? | No  | [Please, explain which kind of regulation and mention the relevant provision on which the powers are based] |
| **Research & Reporting** |
| Can the Competition Authority carry out market studies? | Yes | According the Section 23(1)(c), the Service of the CPC may collect and examine information that are necessary for CPC to exercise its duties. [If the answer is “yes”, include relevant provisions] |
| Can the Competition Authority report to the legislature on the results of market studies? | No  | [If the answer is “yes”, include relevant provisions] |
| **Decision-Making Functions** |
| **Aggregated Functions** |
| Does the Competition Authority make the decision to investigate and make guilty findings? | Yes | According to Section 36(1) of the PCL, the CPC may collect information that is necessary for the exercise of its competences, powers, and duties under the PCL, both on its behalf as well as on behalf of other Competition Authorities, from the undertakings, associations of undertakings, or other private or public entities. Under Section 30(2), the undertakings, associations of undertakings, or other private or public entities shall respond to the CPC’s request within 20 days. Section 30(3)(b) states that public bodies may decline to provide information sought by the CPC in the case that such information would be contrary to the European Union Law or any Law or Regulation or Order aiming at the harmonization with the European Union Law. According to Section 37(1), the CPC may, on its behalf or on behalf of other Competition Authorities, summon any legal or natural person, undertakings, associations of undertakings, representative of other persons or private body, and any natural person for the purpose of taking statements and collecting information. [If the answer is “yes”, include relevant provisions] |
| Does the Competition Authority impose punishments? | Yes | For conduct that restraints trade (both cartel and dominance of market violations), under Section 47 of the PCL, the CPC may: (1). Impose administrative fines not exceeding 10% of the combined annual revenue of the preceding financial year or not exceeding 10% of the sum of total annual revenue from an association of the preceding financial year; (2). Enjoin the violation within a fixed time limit and avoid any repetition in the future; (3). Condemn the violation by a declaratory decision; (4). Impose any behavioral and/or structural measures necessary to enjoin the violation; (5). Impose an administrative fine up to 5% of the average daily revenue during the preceding year, for each day the violation continues, if the business operators do not comply with CPC’s issued decision. Under Section 30(1)(a), when the CPC intends to issue a decision enjoying a violation and the business operator offers commitments to meet CPC’s concern, the CPC may make these commitments binding on the business operator. For concentration/merger violation, according to Section 40, the CPC may impose sanctions on the participants of the concentration who violates the CCBU: (1). An administrative fine not exceeding 10% of the total revenue for the immediately preceding financial year of the business operators who has the obligation for notification, and an administrative fine not exceeding €8,000 (USD $8,705) for every day during the violation continues if the participant closes the transaction without approval; (2). An administrative fine not exceeding €50,000 (USD $54,406) for the supply of false or misleading information in compliance with an obligation; (3). An administrative fine not exceeding €50,000 (USD $54,406) in case of omission to provide information; (4). An administrative fine not exceeding 10 percent of the total revenue for the immediately preceding financial year of the business operators who has the obligation for notification, and an administrative fine not exceeding €8,000 (USD $8,705) for every day during the violation continues if the participant implements the transaction which the CPC declared anticompetitive; (5). An administrative fine not exceeding 10 percent of the total revenue for the immediately preceding financial year of the business operators who has the obligation for notification, and an administrative fine not exceeding €8,000 (USD $8,705) for every day during the violation continues if the participant fails to dissolute or partially dissolute as ordered by the CPC.[ If the answer is “yes”, please mention the different kinds of sanctions that the agency can impose] |
| Is there a single body that carries out the investigation and the guilty findings within the Competition Authority? | Yes | According to the PCL Section 32(a), the proceedings before the CPC shall be of an interrogative and/or investigative nature and the CPC may submit questions, request clarifications and explanations from the parties involved, order the production of evidence, call witnesses and determine matters in dispute for better implantation of the PCL. Under Section 33, the CPC may, upon request or on its own initiative, revoke or amend its decision. Section 34 states that the CPC may order interim measures and impose such terms under the circumstances deems necessary. According to Section 49, the CPC’s ability to impose administrative fines is governed by two statuses of limitation: (1) three years in the case of violation regarding requests for information or inspection; (2). Five years in case of all other violations. The statute of limitation begins to run on the day when the violation is committed and ends when the CPC begins investigation. [Regardless of the answer please explain briefly the enforcement process until the final decision is issued, include relevant provisions, and if the answer is “No” mention how the head of the body that carries out the investigation is elected and removed. The main idea of this last point is to establish whether the investigation authority is, in fact, independent from the decision-making body] |
| Can the Competition Authority’s decisions beappealed to a court? | Yes  | According to PCL Section 20(5), CPC’s decisions shall be subject to judicial review pursuant to Article 146 of the Constitution; and CPC shall participate as an adversary before the Court and shall have the same rights as the parties to the said proceedings.) [Please, mention the judicial authority who is charged with the review, make reference to the relevant provisions, and if there is any requirement to exercise the right of the judicial review.] |
| Please add commentaries or information that you consider relevant and were not covered in any of the previous sections and questions. |  |